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248 Abstract
The primary motives for redistribution were related to the desire to fight poverty 
and to help the poorest. Later on, other motives emerged, such as the desire to 
gain social support and the self-interest of rich people who agree to transfer part 
of their funds provided this increases their utility. 
The aim of the study is to present the determinants of willingness to redistribute in 
a group of Polish students. The case study focuses on sharing behaviour in this 
group. The survey was conducted among 399 students representing four higher 
education institutions in Poland. The research, based on a solidarity game, has 
shown that willingness to share with others depended on gender, the profile of 
studies and the city of studies. 
Keywords: redistribution, gender, income, generosity, social policy
1 INTRODUCTION
Every person that is a member of a group shares some of their resources with oth-
ers. Meeker (1971) points out that sharing and transfer decisions result from 
“exchange principles”: reciprocity, rationality, altruism, status, consistency, joint 
gain and competition (rivalry). Thus, individual sharing behaviour may not lead to 
the results expected at the society/community level. Only the commonality can 
give each person a better chance of realising their interests independently by par-
ticipating in the group. Thus, each community should be built and upheld accord-
ing to the theory of social justice (particularly distributive justice) and fairness 
(Nicolaïdis and Viehoff, 2012).
So, the desired distribution of resources depends on the adopted definition of fair-
ness and social justice. The theory of social justice derives from the concept of fair 
distribution of resources among the members of a society. Fair distribution may be 
determined by the needs, merits, opportunities or outcomes of individual activities 
(Barr, 1993). It may also result from justice in acquisition or transfer (bequest) of 
wealth or come from the rectification of unjust acquisition or transfer (Nozick, 
1974). Utilitarianists claim that just income distribution exists when total social 
welfare (utility) is maximised (Rawls, 1991). Assuming diminishing marginal 
utility, this means the equal distribution of income.
Distribution of income in a society depends on numerous factors, including indi-
vidual decisions taken at different stages of life and the proverbial luck. Apart 
from the definition of justice or fairness used, unfair income allocation creates a 
field for income redistribution that may eliminate undesired inequalities.
Redistribution is a government activity aimed at transferring funds or wealth 
among various groups of citizens. It is an intrinsic element of every social policy 
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249modern state (Tullock, 1997a). By definition, income redistribution means 
changes in the structure of income distribution in favour of certain groups (or 
individuals) and at the cost of others (Stiglitz, 2000). The main reasons for redis-
tribution include (Rawls, 1991; Tullock, 1997a; Dagdeviren, Van Der Hoeven and 
Weeks, 2002):
– generosity – people are willing to help those who are worse off than them-
selves,
– benefits and power – people use redistribution to get power or receive 
some benefits (e.g. politicians),
– envy – people are afraid of those who are frustrated with income inequality 
(low income class) and want to reduce their envy,
– utility maximisation when one operates “behind the veil of ignorance”.
As mentioned earlier, the very first motives of redistribution were related to the 
desire to fight poverty and to help the poorest (Tullock, 1997b). Later on, other 
motives emerged, such as, for instance, the desire to gain social support (compul-
sion through the ballot box), or the self-interest of rich people who agree to transfer 
part of their funds provided this increases their utility (voluntary compulsion) 
(Barr, 1993; Dagdeviren, Van Der Hoeven and Weeks, 2002; Grossman and Help-
man, 1996; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Brunner, Ross and Washington, 2008). 
Previous studies indicated a negative correlation between individual willingness 
to redistribute and level of income (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000; Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2005a). Further experiments in the form of a “solidarity game” (Selten 
and Ockenfels, 1998; Büchner, Coricelli and Greiner, 2007; Bolle et al., 2012), i.e. 
studying the declared willingness to share the win, conducted in several countries 
worldwide, confirmed this thesis. Also, there is a negative correlation between the 
preference for redistribution and income level (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000; 
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005b). Moreover, the willingness to redistribute is higher 
in times of prosperity and lower during periods of unemployment (Brunner, Ross 
and Washington, 2008). Growing income inequality leads, in turn, to more indi-
vidual support for redistribution (Olivera, 2015). The impact of age on redistribu-
tion/solidarity is positive, but it stabilises over time (Kakes and de Winter, 2008). 
Women’s attitude towards income redistribution is on average more generous than 
men’s (Eckel and Grossman, 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003), partly 
because women display different financial behaviours (Walczak and Pieńkowska-
Kamieniecka, 2018). Individuals are also more generous in public than in private 
(Montano-Camposa and Perez-Truglia, 2019). Additionally, diversity of social 
problems in different countries results in people being willing to support the same 
social and professional groups in a different way (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 
2003). In turn van Oorschot (2000) stresses that expectation of reciprocity is of 
great importance for willingness to help. “What have you done, or what can you 
do for us?” – this is the key question asked by the individual (consciously or sub-
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250 The aim of the study is to present the determinants of willingness to redistribute 
in a group of Polish students. Taking into account this aim, the following two 
hypotheses were assumed:
 Hypothesis 1: Women are more willing to redistribute than men.
 Hypothesis 2: People think that they are more generous than others. 
The presented study is based on a “solidarity game”. Solidarity refers to the ties in 
a society that come from unities of interests, goals or standards. Solidarity aims at 
a reciprocal relationship, but a more subtle one than just giving right after one has 
received (Selten and Ockenfels, 1996). Solidarity is also not altruism as it refers to 
carrying common burden undertaking joint efforts so as to maximise the welfare of 
the community. Like the notion of “redistribution” used in the present work, it 
denotes supporting others, but on the group/community level. Hinrichs (1995) 
even points out that justification of redistribution in a society is based on the “cul-
ture of solidarity”/“solidaristic culture” (Karagiannis, 2007). Therefore, solidarity 
can be understood as a redistributive arrangement (Maarse and Paulus, 2003).
The willingness to redistribute among a group of members, or even widely in a 
society, is of utmost importance in times of rising inequalities. Analysis of redis-
tributive attitudes of individuals may help to prepare adequate social policy and 
reduce some of the negative effects resulting from undesired income distribution. 
As mentioned before, studies of individual willingness to redistribute and to share 
the win were conducted in several countries. But no such analysis has been carried 
out in Poland or other Eastern European countries so far. This study, the first 
research project into the redistributive attitudes of Polish people, fills a significant 
gap in this field. 
2 METHODOLOGY
A survey study was conducted in the period from November 2016 to January 
2017. In all, 399 students from four higher education institutions located in three 
cities in Poland, i.e. Warsaw (Central Poland), Toruń (North) and Olsztyn (North-
East) participated in the study. In Warsaw the subjects came from two institutions, 
i.e. the Warsaw School of Economics and the Warsaw University of Technology, 
in Toruń from Nicolaus Copernicus University, and in Olsztyn from the Univer-
sity of Warmia and Mazury.
In each institution the scheme of the study was the same. The students received a 
survey questionnaire which consisted of two parts (in the appendix to this paper). 
The first part included questions regarding their willingness to redistribute while 
the second part contained particulars which allowed identification of the sociode-
mographic characteristics of respondents. In the course of the study the respond-
ents were initially informed that theoretically they were randomly assigned to a 
group of 3 where each person rolls a dice. If they rolled 1, 2, 3, 4, they won, oth-
erwise they lost. Winning means a prize of PLN 101 which can be shared with the 
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251losers inside the group (players may be in groups of 3 winners and losers). Not 
knowing the result of the roll (behind the veil of ignorance), the respondents had 
to decide if and to what degree they would share their prize with other group 
members. They had to take into account the fact that they may also lose and then 
they would receive only as much as others declared to share. They were asked to 
answer the question concerning what part of the win, PLN 10, they would be will-
ing to share with one or two losers from the group. In a further part, the respond-
ents were asked to state their opinion on what part of the prize (PLN 10) other 
group members would be willing to share with the losers (one as well as two 
persons) from their group. The students could freely dispose of the amount greater 
than PLN 0.50. 
To realise the research objectives, in the analysis of the study results non-paramet-
ric methods were used, i.e. the Mann-Whitney U Test, Kruskal-Wallis test with 
multiple comparison tests and Spearman’s rank correlation. The use of non-para-
metric tests resulted from the lack of normality regarding variable distribution. 
SPSS version 24 for Windows was used to conduct all the analyses.
The Mann-Whitney U test is used to compare distributions in two groups of vari-
ables which are at least ordinal in character. It can be used for continuous varia-
bles and also for small samples of subjects (Nachar, 2008). The Mann-Whitney U 
test is valid for data from any distribution, when, for example, there is no assump-
tion regarding normality of distribution. This is an important advantage of this test 
which makes it a frequently used alternative to the t-Student test (Wild and Seber, 
2011). In a general form, the null hypothesis of the test states that the two analysed 
distributions are the same (equal population means or medians) and the alternative 
states the opposite (Feltovich, 2003).
The Mann-Whitney U test for large samples (up to n1=n2=12), when both sample 
sizes are 10 or greater, follows the normal distribution, with parameters (Wild and 
Seber, 2011):
   and   (1)
The test is verified using the normal approximation of the U distribution. 
We also used in this research the Kruskal-Wallis test. This is a more generalised 
form of the Mann-Whitney U test. The Kruskal-Wallis test is an extension of the 
two group Mann-Whitney U test. Like the Mann-Whitney U test, it can be used 
for data that are at least ordinal in character. The null hypothesis of the test states 
that the medians of all the compared groups are equal with the alternative hypoth-
esis stating that at least one group has a median significantly different from the 
rest of the population (McKight and Najab, 2010). Rejection of the null hypothe-
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252 would also like to know in what way these distributions are different. In order to 
understand this, we used the Bonferroni multiple comparisons procedure (Vargha 
and Delaney, 1998; Elliott and Hynan, 2011).
3 RESULTS
In the study 399 students from four higher education institutions located in three 
cities in Poland took part. These were both women and men, students of economic 
and non-economic profiles. The respondents were from undergraduate as well as 
postgraduate studies, both in full-time and part-time form. The characteristics of 
respondents are presented in table 1. 
Table 1 
Characteristics of the group








Place of permanent residencea
  rural areas
  towns < 20 k.
  towns 20-100 k.
  towns 100-500 k.




































  undergraduate studies





aIn the case of gender and place of permanent residence N=398 as one person did not provide 
this data.
Source: own elaboration based on the research.
The average age of subjects was 22.4 years. The average net income per capita in 
their households was PLN 2,399.93, yet it may be observed that it varied depend-
ing on the student’s place of permanent residence. It was the highest among stu-
dents in Warsaw (PLN 3,996.64) and significantly lower among students from 
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253The results of the study indicate that 20% of the subjects would not share their 
prize in the case in which one person lost in their group, yet in the event of there 
being two losers as many as 22.6% subjects would keep the prize to themselves. 
Average amounts of the prize (PLN 10) which the respondents would be willing 
to share with one or two losers as well as the sums that in their opinion other win-
ners would share with the group are presented in graph 1.
graph 1 
Mean declared amounts shared with one and two losers by the respondents if they 
















Source: own elaboration based on the research.
The study shows that the willingness to redistribute, measured with the amount of 
shared sums increases with the number of people who “lost” in the group. How-
ever, as mentioned before, an increased number of losers in a group results in a 
greater number of respondents who do not intend to share their prize at all. If the 
respondents are in a group of two winners and one loser, on average they are will-
ing to share almost one quarter (PLN 2.38) of their prize. In the event in which 
there are two losers in a group, they declare they will transfer nearly one third of 
their prize (PLN 3.27). Moreover, they consider themselves to be more generous 
than other, randomly selected members of the group. They claim that they will 
share more with one as well as two losers than others will (in both cases on aver-
age more by about 20%).
With the use of the Mann-Whitney U test it was confirmed that there are signifi-
cant differences between women and men with regard to the amounts of money 
shared. Women proved to be more generous than men, both with regard to the 
amounts of money they are willing to share as well as the amounts they think oth-
ers would share (not knowing the gender of other group members). Women gener-
ally give more, which results from the fact that mean ranks for women are higher 
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254 Table 2 
How much money the respondents want to give to one and two losers and how 
much money they think others give – depending on gender (Mann-Whitney U Test)
Specificity Respondents Others in respondents’ opinionWomen Men Women Men
For one loser
Mean rank
215.83 158.83 211.27 170.18
U=11,551.500; p=.000 U=12,846.000; p=.001
Mean (in PLN)   2.61   1.83   2.12   1.66
For two losers
Mean rank
212.26 167.72 207.20 180.32
U=12,565.500; p=.000 U=14,002.000; p=.033
Mean (in PLN)   3.52   2.63   2.83   2.37
Source: own elaboration based on the research.
A similar regularity may be observed while analysing mean values declared by the 
respondents. Women are willing to share about 43% more with one loser and 
about 34% more with two losers than men. Just like men, women claim that others 
are less generous than them. However, women also claim that others are more 
willing to share their prize (PLN 2.12 with one and PLN 2.83 with two losers) 
than men do (PLN 1.66 with one and PLN 2.37 with two losers). Therefore, men 
declare their own smaller generosity and perceive others as less generous. The 
difference between women and men regarding the amounts shared by others with 
one loser is 28% and 19% with two losers.
In the article it has also been assessed whether winners who declare to share 
higher amounts with the losers think that others will also be more generous. For 
this purpose, the respondents were divided into three ranges in accordance with 
declared amounts: different for amounts shared with one loser (up to PLN 1, from 
PLN 1 to 3, over PLN 3) and different for amounts for two losers (up to PLN 1, 
from PLN 1 to 5, over PLN 5) due to lower amounts declared for one loser and 
higher for two losers. Next, the average amounts shared by the respondents and 
other group members in particular ranges were compared. As a result of Kruskal-
Wallis tests where mean variable levels were compared, it may be concluded that 
there are statistically significant differences among them. Similar regularities may 
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255graph 2 
Mean declared amounts to be shared with one and two losers by the respondents 
if they win PLN 10 and amounts that will be shared by other winners with the 













Up to PLN 1 From PLN 1 to 3 PLN 3 and more
Section for respondents
Mean respondents (in PLN) Mean others (in PLN)
x2 =114.739, df=2, p=.000 (for “Mean respondents”); x2=356.993, df=2, p=.002 
(for “Mean others”)
Source: own elaboration based on the research.
graph 3 
Comparison of how much respondents from particular ranges will on average share 














Up to PLN 1 From PLN 1 to 5 PLN 5 and more
Section for respondents
Mean respondents (in PLN) Mean others (in PLN)
x2 =361.128, df=2, p=.000 (for “Mean respondents”); x2=148.193, df=2, p=.000 
(for “Mean others”)
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256 On the basis of these data two basic conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, it can be 
observed that more generous persons claim that others are also more generous. As 
the amount shared by the respondents with other losers increased, they thought 
that others would also be willing to share more with the losers. Secondly, it was 
again confirmed, that the respondents perceive themselves as more generous than 
others. Thus the second hypothesis was supported. Only those willing to share 
with one and two losers the lowest amounts from their prize of PLN 10 claimed 
that others would share more. For instance, the respondents from the first range 
(i.e. up to PLN 1) were willing to share on average PLN 0.23 with one loser, but 
they claimed that others in this situation would share PLN 0.97. On the other 
hand, respondents willing to share the highest amounts with one loser (i.e. from 
the range over PLN 3) on average wanted to share PLN 3.92 and they claimed that 
others would share PLN 2.78 (graph 2). The situation is similar in the case of shar-
ing with two losers where the respondents from the highest range (i.e. over PLN 
5) on average wanted to share PLN 5.49 with the losers and claimed that others in 
this situation would share only PLN 4.05 (graph 3).
With the use of the Mann-Whitney U test it was also concluded that there are 
significant differences between students of economic and non-economic profiles 
with respect to the shared amounts. Comparison of mean ranks indicates that the 
students of economic profiles are more generous and they expect others to be 
more generous, by contrast to non-economic profiles (see table 3).
 
Table 3 
How much money the respondents want to give to one and two losers and how 
much money they think others will give – depending on the study (Mann-Whitney 
U Test)
Specificity Respondents Others in respondents’ opinion
Profile of 
studies Economic Non-economic Economic Non-economic
For one loser
Mean rank
205.97 164.19 206.56 160.65
U=7,706.000; p=.010 U=7,504.000; p=.005
Mean (in PLN) 2.47 1.85 2.07 1.56
For two losers
Mean rank
205.13 169.19 206.23 162.61
U=7,991.000; p=.027 U=7,616.000; p=.007
Mean (in PLN) 3.38 2.61 2.80 2.03
Source: own elaboration based on the research.
A similar regularity may be observed when analysing the means. For instance, the 
students of economic profiles were willing to share PLN 2.47 on average with one 
loser whereas the students of non-economic profiles were 33.5% less willing. In 
the opinion of students of economic profiles, others would be also more generous. 
They claimed that others would share PLN 2.80 with two losers while the students 
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257Additionally, the Mann-Whitney U test was conducted in order to evaluate if there 
is a link between the declared amount and the level of studies. P-value higher than 
.05 was obtained, therefore the null hypothesis regarding lack of correlation 
between the above mentioned variables was not rejected.
The results of Spearman’s rank correlation indicate that age, place of permanent 
residence and mean net income per person in the subject’s household were not 
significant. Therefore, these variables do not correlate with respondents’ willing-
ness to share part of their prize with the losers as well as with the respondents’ 
opinion of others’ willingness to redistribute. 
In the study presented in this article conducted in institutions of higher education 
in Warsaw, Toruń and Olsztyn it was also assessed if there were differences in 
answers given by students from these cities. As a result of the Kruskal-Wallis tests 
conducted it may be stated that there were statistically significant differences, but 
only between the students from Olsztyn and those from Toruń (p-value ≤.005) 
(see table 4).
Table 4 
Testing the relationship between the declared amount and the city of studies 
(Kruskal-Wallis test)
Specificity x2 Significance adjusteda
Mean (in PLN)
– pair comparison
Respondents for two losers
Olsztyn-Toruń 44.867 .007 2.95 – 3.75
Others for one loser
Olsztyn-Toruń 42.835 .010 1.73 – 2.32
Others for two losers
Olsztyn-Toruń 46.350 .005 2.35 – 3.16
Note: significance adjusted by Bonferroni’s method.
Source: own elaboration based on the research.
The comparison of mean amounts indicates that in each of the cases above where 
statistically significant differences were observed, students from Olsztyn were 
definitely less generous than students from Toruń. They were willing to share 
lower amounts with two losers, and also they claimed that others would share 
lower amounts, with one as well as two losers.
4 DISCUSSION
Our research generally confirms the results of other studies where it is analysed 
whether demographic factors influence generosity and willingness to redistribute. 
There is evidence in the literature that social and economic behaviour varies with 
respect to gender. Many authors (Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Warner, 1991; 
Oswald and Powdthavee, 2010; Cox and Deck, 2006; Chaudhuri and Gangad-
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258 redistribution and altruism. Nonetheless, it may be observed that this impact is not 
unambiguous and equal. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005b) prove in their research 
that women are 4 percentage points more likely to give the highest support and 3 
percentage points less likely to give the lowest support to the poor. Landry et al. 
(2005) find that contributions to public good are higher when women are involved 
in their raising. In effect, women are more likely to conduct effective collections 
and charities than men. By contrast, Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993) and Cox 
(2002) suggest that men are more generous than women. Also, Cox and Deck 
(2006) on the basis of their research conclude that there is no simple and unam-
biguous answer to the question regarding who is more generous as it depends on 
the decision context, like social distance between the decision-makers and others, 
total monetary cost of generosity, or occurrence of reciprocal motivation. How-
ever, in our study we prove that women are more generous, they are willing to 
share bigger amounts with others and, therefore, they display a higher level of 
reciprocity than men do.
Jung et al. (2014) also claim that our behaviour is heavily influenced by the percep-
tion of the behaviours of others. We observe others and our beliefs about them 
impact on how we decide to behave in a particular situation. Moreover, people tend 
to think that they are fairer and more generous than others (Epley and Dunning, 
2000; Dunning, Meyerowitz and Holzberg, 1989) who, in their opinion, are defi-
nitely more selfish. This results from the fact that people prefer to have rather posi-
tive than negative beliefs about themselves (Allison, Messick and Goethals, 1989). 
Thus, as in our study, people think that others are less willing to share what they 
have, demonstrate less empathy and a lower degree of reciprocity than themselves.
Another issue broadly discussed in the literature is whether the rich are less will-
ing to redistribute than the poor. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005b) state that the 
impact of income on preferences for redistribution is complex. This is reflected in 
the results of numerous studies conducted worldwide. For instance, Andreoni, 
Nikiforakis and Stoop (2017) claim that there are no differences in pro-social 
preferences between the poor and the rich. Also, Schervish and Havens (1995) 
found that generosity is not strongly related with income, but they see the differ-
ence between the absolute (the amount which people want to donate for charity) 
and relative giving (amount donated in relation to the income of a given house-
hold). They conclude that though people with a higher level of education are more 
generous, proportionately, the poor and the rich share the same amount, i.e. the 
same part of their income. In turn Li (2015) thinks that in relative terms people 
with lower incomes tend to give more. Alternatively, James and Sharpe (2007) 
prove that the poor and the rich have the same willingness to give more. None-
theless, people with middle incomes are less willing to share with others. In our 
study we observed that the income of respondents’ households did not impact on 
their willingness to redistribute the hypothetical prize, nor did their place of 
 permanent residence. Similar observations were made by Yao (2015), who claims 
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259can also find other results in the literature concerning the place of residence (Car-
roll, McCarthy and Newman, 2005; Regnerus, Smith and Sikkink, 1998; Andreoni 
and Scholz, 1998) where living in larger communities increases the chances for 
support to the poorest. But according to the studies of Ma et al. (2015) it may be 
concluded that a rural upbringing produced people who were more generous than 
those with an urban upbringing.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The study shows that people are willing to redistribute when they make decisions 
behind the veil of ignorance, i.e. in a game with random outcomes. The results 
indicate a sense of solidarity among Polish students, which increases with the 
number of people in need. 
The results of our research support the two assumed hypotheses. Firstly, women 
tend to be more willing to redistribute their income than men. Secondly, there is a 
general human tendency to perceive oneself as more generous than others. The 
mean value of the amount others would share declared by the respondents was 
significantly lower than the mean quota that each respondent was willing to dis-
tribute individually. Therefore, it can be stated that the declared willingness of the 
individual to share is significantly different from the assessment of other players’ 
tendency to redistribute declared by the same individual. 
The more people are willing to redistribute, the more they tend to think others will 
be prepared to redistribute too. In this respect it may constitute a certain reference 
to solidarity, the sense of community and expectation of reciprocity. The more the 
individual is willing to help, the more they are convinced that others will also help 
them in a case in which they are worse off. As a result, one’s generosity deter-
mines how other’s generosity is perceived. 
The study did not show a correlation between the willingness to share the prize 
(redistribute) and the level of income, age and place of residence. However, the 
profile of studies and partially the place of studies turned out to be of significance. 
Economics students are more willing to share their financial resources than stu-
dents of non-economic ones. Moreover, they claim that others are less generous 
than themselves. The reason behind this difference may result from various 
aspects, such as personality, which determines the choice of study profile, as well 
as the idiosyncrasies of economic studies that shape the students’ worldview, or 
both factors jointly. Nonetheless, of importance is the direction of the impact: 
students of economic profiles are more generous. 
The willingness to redistribute, therefore, results from numerous variables, which 
confirms all previous studies in this area. The research conduct allows us to draw 
attention to the individual and subjective perception of distribution. This conclu-
sion is especially significant with respect to social policy in any country. Knowing 
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260 offered “something” in the long-term, is of utmost importance for policy makers. 
The sense of community and expectations of mutual benefits may be used to reach 
a broad social consensus on social transfers, like a “fair solidarity tax” from the 
richest to the most needy, but not only based on the income criteria. 
This study has some limitations. Firstly, other factors, including, for example, the 
number of persons in the household or marital status of the participants, have not 
been taken into account. Secondly, according to the original paper we used non-
random sampling. In order to increase the representativeness of the research future 
studies with random sampling should be conducted.
Disclosure statement 
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261APPENDIX
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
1 If I win PLN 10 I am willing to hand over to each loser in my group
a in the case of one loser PLN ................. .
b in the case of two losers PLN ................ .
2 How much do you think the others would be willing to hand over to each loser on average?
a in the case of one loser PLN ................... .
b in the case of two losers PLN .................. .
3 Age
 I’m …………………………. years old






6 Year of studies
Year 1 of the undergraduate studies
Year 2 of the undergraduate studies
Year 3 of the undergraduate studies
Year 1 of the postgraduate studies
Year 2 of the postgraduate studies
7 Place of residence 
Rural areas
Towns < 20 k.
Towns 20-100 k.
Towns 100-500 k.
Cities > 500 k.
8 Average monthly net income per person in your household
……………………………… PLN
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262 Added by the researcher (after filling in by the group)
9 Form of studies
Full-time
Part-time





Warsaw School of Economics
Warsaw University of Technology
Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
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